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Note
Carey v. Lovett: New Jersey's Unsound
Expansion of Medical Malpractice Liability
I. Introduction
During this century, recovery for negligent infliction of
emotional distress has developed through an evolutionary pro-
cess that now encompasses five distinct rules.' The earliest
cases seeking recovery for negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress were decided under the impact rule. 2 This rule required
the plaintiff to prove physical impact to himself, no matter how
slight, in order to recover for resulting emotional distress.
3
American courts adhered to this rule until the 1960s, when
some jurisdictions adopted the "zone of danger" rule,4 allowing,
for the first time, recovery to a "bystander" without his proving
that he was injured from direct impact.5 In 1968, the California
Supreme Court abandoned the zone of danger rule and used a
"foreseeability test"6 in deciding Dillon v. Legg.7 The Dillon rule
allowed a bystander to recover for reasonably foreseeable emo-
1. John L. Ropiequet, Emotional Distress Claims in Medical Malpractice
Cases, 11 J. LEGAL MED. 59, 60 (1990). "The major rules that now govern claims
for negligent infliction of emotional distress can be categorized as follows: (1) the
impact rule; (2) the zone of physical danger rule; (3) the Dillon rule of foreseeabil-
ity; (4) the relaxed foreseeability rule; and (5) the direct victim rule." Id.
2. See, e.g., Ward v. West Jersey & S. R.R., 47 A. 561 (N.J. 1900); Mitchell v.
Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896). See also infra part II.A.
3. Ropiequet, supra note 1, at 60. See also Ward, 47 A. at 561 (recovery denied
for mental disturbance caused by fright without accompanying impact); Mitchell,
151 N.Y. at 110, 45 N.E. at 355 (no cause of action where plaintiff suffered illness
resulting in a miscarriage due to fear of being struck by a negligently driven horse-
car when there was no direct impact).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 35-37.
5. Ropiequet, supra note 1, at 61.
6. Id. at 60.




tional distress as long as certain criteria were met.8 In Dillon,
the court held that in cases where a plaintiff suffered shock that
resulted in physical injury, the courts should determine
whether the defendant should have foreseen injury to the "by-
stander" plaintiff by considering the following factors:
(1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as
contrasted with one who was a distance away from it. (2)
Whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon
plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the
accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident from others
after its occurrence. (3) Whether plaintiff and the victim [of the
accident] were closely related, as contrasted with an absence of
any relationship or the presence of only a distant relationship. 9
Over the past twenty-five years, "like the pebble cast into the
pond, Dillon's progeny have created ever widening circles of
liability."10
Some courts, in continuing to expand liability for emotional
distress, have used a "direct victim" rule," although not label-
ling it as such. 12 Under this theory, plaintiffs have recovered,
although they were not physically injured nor considered by-
standers for recovery purposes; rather, these plaintiffs were
considered the "direct victims" 3 of the defendants' acts.14
8. Dillon, 441 P.2d at 920.
9. Id.
10. Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 819 (Cal. 1989).
11. See infra part II.D.
12. See, e.g., Giardina v. Bennett, 545 A.2d 139 (N.J. 1988).
13. See infra part II.D. The latest definition of the direct victim rule given by
the California Supreme Court states that a plaintiff seeking to recover for negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress as a direct victim must prove the traditional
elements of negligence-duty, breach, proximate cause, and damages. Burgess v.
Superior Court, 831 P.2d 1197, 1200 (Cal. 1992). Differing from bystander cases
where the defendant does not owe a specific duty of care to the plaintiff, direct
victim cases involve defendants who breach a duty of care that is either owed to
the plaintiff as a matter of law or that arises out of relationship between the two.
See id.
14. Giardina, 545 A.2d at 143. In Thing, the court noted:
Post-Dillon decisions have now permitted plaintiffs who suffer emotional
distress, but no resultant physical injury, and who were not at the scene of
and thus did not witness the event that injured another, to recover damages
on grounds that a duty was owed to them solely because it was foreseeable
that they would suffer distress on learning of injury to a close relative.




In 1993, the New Jersey Supreme Court reviewed Carey v.
Lovett. 15 This case dealt with the recovery of damages by a
mother for emotional distress caused by medical malpractice. 16
The alleged malpractice led to the birth and subsequent death
of her severely brain damaged daughter. 17 Prior cases dealing
with emotional distress claims required direct impact 18 or, for
bystander recovery, "that claimants observe contemporaneously
the act of malpractice and the resulting injury."19 The Carey
court held that a mother may recover for emotional distress
caused by the premature birth and death of her baby, without
proving either physical injury to herself or contemporaneous ob-
servation,20 as long as she proved "that she suffered emotional
distress so severe that it resulted in physical manifestations or
that it destroyed her basic emotional security."2' Although
"[tihe Court [did] not define or give examples of 'severe' emo-
tional distress, [i]ts review of the facts suggests that psychiatric
treatment, impairment of lifestyle and significant residuals
would support a legitimate claim."22
The Carey case is the focus of this Note because it repre-
sents a significant departure from prior New Jersey case law,
substantially extending liability in medical malpractice cases
for negligent infliction of emotional distress, but fails to estab-
lish workable guidelines for future court decisions. Part II of
this Note reviews the evolution of recovery for negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress in New Jersey. Part III presents the
procedural history, substantive facts, and court decision in Ca-
rey v. Lovett.2 Part IV is an analysis of the court's decision.
Part V discusses the larger social impact of the Carey decision.
15. 622 A.2d 1279 (N.J. 1993).
16. Id. at 1284. The father also brought suit for emotional distress, but the
court denied him recovery because he lacked the same interconnectedness to the
fetus as the mother and he did not contemporaneously observe the malpractice.
Id. at 1287-88.
17. Id. at 1284.
18. Id. at 1285. See, e.g., Ward v. West Jersey & S. R.R., 47 A. 561 (N.J.
1900); Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
19. Carey, 622 A.2d at 1286; see infra note 37 and cases cited therein.
20. Carey, 622 A.2d at 1286-87.
21. Id. at 1288.
22. Ronald B. Grayzel, Tort Law, N.J. L.J., Sept. 6, 1993, at 66, 76.






In the early part of the twentieth century, state courts were
reluctant to recognize an actionable interest in peace of mind,
especially when the defendant's conduct was merely negligent.24
Three main concerns of the courts have been:
(1) [T]he problem of permitting legal redress for harm that is
often temporary and relatively trivial; (2) the danger that claims
of mental harm will be falsified or imagined; and (3) the perceived
unfairness of imposing heavy and disproportionate financial bur-
dens upon a defendant, whose conduct was only negligent, for con-
sequences which appear remote from the "wrongful act."25
In Ward v. West Jersey & Seashore Railroad,26 the plaintiff
sued to recover for physical illness resulting from apprehension
of physical harm.27 The court, in denying relief, stated that "a
person is responsible only for the natural and proximate results
of his negligent act; [and] that physical suffering is not the prob-
able or natural consequences of fright, in the case of a person of
ordinary physical and mental vigor ... "25 Reflecting the un-
derlying rationale in a majority of jurisdictions, 29 the court was
concerned that allowing recovery would result in a "flood of liti-
gation in cases where the injury complained of may be easily
feigned... and where the damages must rest upon mere conjec-
ture and speculation."30 Consequently, until 1965, the law in
24. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 54,
at 360 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER ON TORTS].
25. Id. at 360-61. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 110, 45
N.E. 354, 354-55 (1896), cited in Ward v. West Jersey & S. R.R., 47 A. 561, 562
(N.J. 1900).
26. 47 A. 561 (N.J. 1900).
27. Id. at 561.
28. Id. at 562.
29. PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 24, § 54, at 361.
30. Ward, 47 A. at 562. "Mental disturbance is easily simulated, and courts
which are plagued with fraudulent personal injury claims may be unwilling to
open the door to an even more dubious field." PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 24,
§ 54, at 361. Objections to allowing recovery for negligent infliction of emotional
distress have been predicated on the difficulty of measuring mental disturbance in
monetary terms and the belief that a substantial increase in litigation would fol-
low. Id. § 54, at 360. Therefore, "[wihere the defendant's negligence causes only




New Jersey allowed recovery for emotional distress only when
accompanied by physical impact.31
This rule was overturned by the New Jersey Supreme
Court in Falzone v. Busch.32 In Falzone, plaintiff's husband
was struck and injured by the automobile of a negligent driver
as he stood in a field adjoining a roadway.33 The plaintiff, who
was sitting nearby in their parked car, sought to recover for ill-
ness resulting from fear for her safety caused by the defendant's
negligence, although there was no physical impact. 34 In over-
ruling Ward, the Falzone court promulgated a new rule, stating:
[W]here negligence causes fright from a reasonable fear of imme-
diate personal injury, which fright is adequately demonstrated to
have resulted in substantial bodily injury or sickness, the injured
person may recover if such bodily injury or sickness would be re-
garded as proper elements of damage had they occurred as a con-
sequence of direct physical injury rather than fright.... [W]here
fright does not cause substantial bodily injury or sickness, it is to
be regarded as too lacking in seriousness and too speculative to
warrant the imposition of liability.3 5
This "zone of danger" rule,36 extended recovery for emotional
distress to individuals who were within the zone of danger cre-
ated by the defendant's negligence and were thereby threatened
with physical injury themselves. 37 The court, realizing that dif-
great majority of courts still hold that... there can be no recovery." Id. § 54, at
361.
31. Frame v. Kothari, 560 A.2d 675, 677 (N.J. 1989).
32. 214 A.2d 12, 17 (N.J. 1965).
33. Id. at 13.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
36. See PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 24, § 54, at 365.
37. See, e.g., Diaz v. Drury, No. 525809, 1993 WL 407929 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Oct. 5, 1993) (allowing a mother injured in an automobile accident who witnessed
injury to her daughters to recover for emotional distress because, inter alia, she
was in the zone of danger); Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 457 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ill.
1983) (holding that an individual "who is in the zone of physical danger and...
fears for his own safety is given a right of action for physical injury or illness re-
sulting from emotional distress"); Shirk v. Kelsey, 617 N.E.2d 152 (111. App. Ct.
1993) (affirming cause of action stated for malpractice and emotional distress re-
sulting from an incomplete abortion); Bovsun v. Sanperi, 61 N.Y.2d 219, 461
N.E.2d 843, 473 N.Y.S.2d 357 (1984) (permitting plaintiff to recover for injuries
resulting from the observation of injury or death of a family member, if the defend-
ant negligently exposed the plaintiff to injury and the negligence was a substantial




ficulties could arise, specifically required that the resulting in-
jury be substantial, 38 as it was concerned about tracing a causal
connection between the fright and the claimed physical injury.39
However, it asserted its confidence that the trial courts,
"through the rules of evidence and the requirements as to the
sufficiency of evidence, [could] safeguard against the danger
that juries will find facts without legally adequate proof."4°
Bystander recovery for emotional distress was further ex-
tended in 1980, when the New Jersey Supreme Court reviewed
Portee v. Jaffee.41 In Portee, plaintiff watched as her son suf-
fered and died as a result of being trapped between defendant's
negligently maintained elevator and the wall of the elevator
shaft.42 The court had to decide whether a plaintiff could re-
cover for emotional distress resulting from seeing the negli-
gently inflicted injuries to another, even though she was in no
danger of personal injury herself.43 As the court noted, "[t]he
task in [this] case involve[d] the refinement of principles of lia-
bility to remedy violations of reasonable care while avoiding
speculative results or punitive liability."44 The Portee court fol-
lowed the California Supreme Court decision in Dillon v. Legg,45
in allowing plaintiff's recovery for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress.46
Building on the criteria set forth in Dillon,47 Portee estab-
lished the following requirements of proof:
(1) [T]he death or serious physical injury of another caused by
defendant's negligence; (2) a marital or intimate, familial rela-
tionship between plaintiff and the injured person; (3) observation
of the death or injury at the scene of the accident; and (4) result-
ing severe emotional distress. 48
38. Falzone, 214 A.2d at 16-17.
39. Id. at 16.
40. Id.
41. 417 A.2d 521 (N.J. 1980).
42. Id. at 522-23.
43. Id. at 522.
44. Id. at 526.
45. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968). In Dillon, the California Supreme Court held
that the plaintiff could recover for emotional shock caused by observing the death
of her child even though she was not in peril of being injured. Id. at 915, 925.
46. Portee, 417 A.2d at 526-28.
47. See supra text accompanying note 9.




The court stressed that existence of a close relationship between
the plaintiff and the injured party was the most important ele-
ment, but acknowledged that observation of the death or injury
was also essential. 49 The court reasoned that "[w]ithout such
perception, the threat of emotional injury is lessened and the
justification for liability is fatally weakened."50
B. Medical Malpractice Cases Decided Under the Impact
Rule
Once the New Jersey Supreme Court adopted the Dillon
rule allowing for bystander recovery, suits followed specifically
dealing with medical malpractice and the emotional distress
this caused to family members. 51 From 1979 until the present,
when medical malpractice was the basis for emotional distress
to close family members, New Jersey courts have relied on
either the "direct impact" rule52 or Dillon bystander rule.53 The
"zone of danger" rule does not lend itself to use in medical mal-
practice cases because family members claiming a cause of ac-
tion are rarely in physical danger themselves. 54 Several of
these cases are particularly pertinent in analyzing the Carey v.
Lovett decision.
Prior to the Portee decision, in two malpractice cases involv-
ing birth defects,55 recovery was allowed based on what the
court found to be "direct injury" to the parents. 56 In Berman v.
Allan,57 parents brought medical malpractice actions for, among
other things, the "wrongful birth" of their daughter, who was
49. Id. at 526-27.
50. Id. at 527.
51. See, e.g., Frame v. Kothari, 560 A.2d 675 (N.J. 1989); Polikoff v. Calabro,
506 A.2d 1285 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986); Lindenmuth v. Alperin, 484 A.2d
1316 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984).
52. See, e.g., Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755 (N.J. 1984); Berman v. Allan, 404
A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979); Friel v. Vineland Obstetrical & Gynecological Professional
Ass'n, 400 A.2d 147 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979).
53. See, e.g., Frame v. Kothari, 560 A.2d 675 (N.J. 1989); Giardina v. Bennett,
545 A.2d 139 (N.J. 1988); Polikoff v. Calabro, 506 A.2d 1285 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1986); Lindenmuth v. Alperin, 484 A.2d 1316 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984).
54. Ropiequet, supra note 1, at 62.
55. Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979); Friel v. Vineland Obstetrical and
Gynecological Professional Ass'n, 400 A.2d 147 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979).
56. Berman, 404 A.2d at 15; Friel, 400 A.2d at 152.




born afflicted with Down's syndrome. 58 The parents sought to
recover damages for "the emotional anguish they . . . exper-
ienced and [would] continue to experience as a result of [their
child]'s birth defect."59 The Bermans alleged that, given Mrs.
Berman's age, 60 the defendants deviated from accepted medical
standards by not informing her of the availability of a procedure
known as amniocentesis. 61 Since Mrs. Berman was over thirty-
five years old when she conceived, the risk was substantial that
her child would be born with Down's syndrome. 62 The plaintiffs
asserted that "sound medical practice at the time of [the] preg-
nancy required defendants to inform her both of this risk and
the availability of amniocentesis."63 Mrs. Berman claimed that
this would have allowed her to decide, if the test proved posi-
tive, whether to abort the fetus.64 The trial court granted sum-
mary judgment for the defendants on the ground that the
Bermans failed to state any actionable claim for relief.65 The
plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal to the Appellate Division, but
the New Jersey Supreme Court directly certified the case on its
58. Id. at 9-10. "Down's syndrome [is] a genetic defect commonly referred to
as mongolism." Id. at 10.
59. Id. at 10.
60. Id. Mrs. Berman was 38 years old at the time of her pregnancy. Id.
Amniocentesis is usually recommended only for women over the age of 35 (who are
more likely to have a child with Down's syndrome... )." AMERICAN MEDICAL AsSO-
CIATION ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICINE 95 (1989).
61. Berman, 404 A.2d at 10.
"[Amniocentesis] involves the insertion of a long needle into the mother's
uterus and the removal therefrom of a sample of amniotic fluid containing
living fetal cells. Through 'karyotype analysis'-a procedure in which the
number and structure of the cells' chromosomes are examined-the sex of
the fetus as well as the presence of gross chromosomal defects can be de-
tected .... Recent studies indicate that amniocentesis is highly accurate in
predicting the presence of chromosomal defects, and that the risk of even
minor damage to mother or fetus deriving from the procedure is less than
one percent."
Id. Amniocentesis is a diagnostic procedure performed in order to detect fetal ab-
normalities such as Down's syndrome, which is a chromosome abnormality.
"here is a slight increased incidence of threatened miscarriage . .. after amni-
ocentesis (older studies show a risk of 1 to 2 percent; more recent studies show a
risk of about 0.5 percent)." AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
MEDICINE 95 (1989).
62. Berman, 404 A.2d at 10.
63. Id.
64. Id.




own motion.66 The court held that both parents had stated ac-
tionable claims for relief based upon defendants' depriving
them "of the option to accept or reject a parental relationship
with the child,"67 and remanded the case for trial. 8 The court
offered no explanation as to what specific act it deemed to be a
"direct impact" on Mrs. Berman, but instead, found a cause of
action in the "direct injury" to Mrs. Berman caused by her loss
of the right to abort the fetus.6 9
Another case dealing with recovery for emotional distress
based on direct injury to the mother was Friel v. Vineland Ob-
stetrical & Gynecological Professional Ass'n.70 The issue in Friel
was whether a mother could recover for malpractice, 71 not only
for her own injury, but also for her mental anguish related to
the premature delivery of her baby.72
The plaintiff, Betty Friel, in her thirty-first week of preg-
nancy, noticed vaginal bleeding and was instructed by defend-
ants, her treating physicians, to take aspirin and a shot of
whiskey.73 A few days later during an office visit, defendant in-
formed Mrs. Friel that she had a bladder infection and pre-
scribed medication.74 One week later, Mrs. Friel was still
bleeding and suffering from cramps. She went to the hospital,
where her doctor "examined her, reaffirmed his diagnosis and
advised [her] to go home."75 Two days later, Mrs. Friel became
violently ill, suffered convulsions, continued to bleed, and was
66. Id.
67. Id. at 14.
68. Id. at 15.
69. Id. at 14.
70. 400 A.2d 147 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979).
71. Id. at 148, 151. The malpractice claim was based on the plaintiff's allega-
tions that defendant doctors misdiagnosed her illness and were not in attendance
when her baby was delivered. Id. at 149.
72. Id. at 148. Mrs. Friel's baby suffered from several serious disorders at
birth. Id. at 149. Mrs. Friel's mental anguish and anxiety were allegedly caused
by the premature delivery of her baby and uncertainty as to the child's develop-
ment resulting from its damage at birth. Id. at 148.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. "The final diagnosis was that Betty Friel had suffered an abruptio pla-
centa." Id. at 149. Abruptio placenta is a "premature detachment of a normally
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admitted to the hospital at about 8:00 p.m. 76 Mrs. Friel was
treated with Demero177 and intravenous oxytocin 78 and left in
the labor room with no one in attendance. 79 When the baby was
born at 10:26 p.m., no episiotomy ° was performed and no mem-
ber of defendant doctors' practice was present.81 The baby was
"cyanotic,8 2 suffered intracranial hemorrhaging,8 3 apnea,84 and
central nervous system difficulties.8
The court held that Mrs. Friel was entitled to recover for
any injury caused by the delay in her diagnosis.8 6 Even if she
76. Friel, 400 A.2d at 149.
77. Demerol is a "synthetic opioid analgesic... [which] is preferred to mor-
phine for obstetric use because its rapid onset of action and shorter duration usu-
ally permit greater flexibility in maternal analgesia, possibly with less effect on
neonatal respiration." AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION DRUG EVALUATIONS AN.
NUAL 105 (1993).
78. Oxytocin is a "hormone used for the induction or stimulation of labor, in
the management of postpartum hemorrhage...." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY
1012 (5th Unabr. Lawyers' ed. 1982).
79. Friel, 400 A.2d at 149. Mrs. Friel's expert witness stated in his report that
"[ilt is considered customary practice that during intravenous oxytocin stimulation
the following biologic parameters are carefully monitored every ten minutes; the
blood pressure, the rate of flow of oxytocin, the frequency and intensity of the uter-
ine contractions and the fetal heart rate." Id. There was no record of this having
been done. Id.
80. An episiotomy is a "[s]urgical incision of the vulva to prevent laceration at
the time of delivery. . . ." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 477-78 (5th Unabr.
Lawyers' ed. 1982). Episiotomy is used to enlarge the vaginal opening, which is
necessary in a breech delivery, when there is little opportunity for gradual stretch-
ing of the perineal tissue to occur. An episiotomy is done to speed delivery when
the baby is not getting enough oxygen during labor. It also reduces pressure on the
head of a premature baby. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
MEDICINE 414-15 (1989).
81. Friel, 400 A.2d at 149.
82. Cyanosis is "a bluish discoloration of the skin and mucous membranes re-
sulting from an inadequate amount of oxygen in the blood." BANTAM MEDICAL DIC-
TIONARY 107 (Revised ed. 1990).
83. Intracranial hemorrhaging is the "escape of blood within the cranium...
frequently leading to [the] formation of" local accumulations of blood. STEDMAN'S
MEDICAL DICrIONARY 627, 637 (5th Unabr. Lawyers' ed. 1982). In his report of
June 9, 1977, the plaintiff's expert witness noted that "premature infants are occa-
sionally known to suffer intracranial hemorrhage without apparent cause. There
would seem sufficient reasons in this case for traumas to the head to produce such
injury. I refer specifically to the use of intravenous oxytocin, the omission of episi-
otomy, etc." Friel, 400 A.2d at 149.
84. Apnea means "[t]he absence of breathing." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTION-
ARY 97 (5th Unabr. Lawyers' ed. 1982).
85. Friel, 400 A.2d at 149.




could not prove direct physical injury, she could recover for pain
and suffering if she could prove it was proximately caused by
defendants' acts and omissions and occurred during the period
of delay.8 7 Additionally, the court held that "[i]f negligence in
treatment from April 30 to May 9 [could] be shown, . . . any
proven emotional upset caused by anxiety over possible harm to
the unborn child during that period [was] compensable."8 8
Here, Mrs. Friel did suffer physically due to the doctors' mis-
diagnosis of her condition. This led the court to find that the
direct injury to the mother was sufficient to sustain a claim for
the resulting emotional distress caused by the injury to her in-
fant by the same misdiagnosis.8 9 Unlike Mrs. Berman, Mrs.
Friel's cause of action was soundly based on "direct impact" be-
cause she was physically harmed by defendants' negligence.
In Procanik v. Cillo,90 parents sued for, among other things,
emotional distress resulting from the birth of a child with birth
defects.91 Mrs. Procanik consulted the defendant doctors be-
cause she had contracted what was diagnosed as measles dur-
ing her first trimester of pregnancy. 92 She did not, however,
know if her illness had been measles or German measles. 93 The
defendant doctor tested Mrs. Procanik to ascertain if she had
suffered from German measles. 94 He mistakenly deduced that
she had not been exposed during her pregnancy.95 Due to the
doctor's negligent interpretation of that test, Mrs. Procanik was
denied the opportunity to decide whether to allow her preg-
nancy to continue or to abort the fetus.96
Before trial, the Procaniks stipulated that they knew they
had a potential cause of action almost three years before they
87. Id.
88. Id. at 151.
89. Id. at 152. See PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 24, § 54, at 362-63 (stating
that where defendant's negligence causes physical injury, the plaintiff may recover
for accompanying mental damage).
90. 478 A.2d 755 (N.J. 1984).
91. Id. at 757. The infant was "born with multiple birth defects, including eye









brought suit.97 The trial court granted defendant's motion to
dismiss, finding that the plaintiff's claim was barred by the two
year statute of limitations.98 The appellate court affirmed. 99 On
appeal to the New Jersey Supreme Court, the Procaniks sought
to renew their claim for emotional distress asserting that their
cause of action was derived from the infant's cause of action. 00
This would toll the statute of limitations during infancy and
protect their claim. 101 Referring to its decision in Berman v. Al-
lan,10 2 the supreme court noted that "parents may recover for
emotional distress for the 'wrongful birth' of a child born with
birth defects." 103 The court found that "[a]t one time Mr. and
Mrs. Procanik had independent claims for their emotional dis-
tress" 10 4 because they "were deprived of the choice of terminat-
ing the pregnancy."105 The court held that "the parents' claim
was independent from that of the child,"10 6 and that their right
to recover was not based on the child's injury, but on the "direct
injury to their own independent rights."0 7 The Procaniks'
cause of action for emotional distress was disallowed, however,
because the statute of limitations had run.108
C. Bystander Recovery Cases-The Dillon Rule
The criteria for recovery enumerated in Dillon were meant
"to limit the otherwise potential[ly] infinite liability which
would follow every negligent act" by holding the defendant lia-
ble only for injuries which he could reasonably foresee.l°9 The
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 757.
100. Id. at 758.
101. Id.
102. 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979). See supra notes 57-69 and accompanying text.
103. Procanik, 478 A.2d at 758.
104. Id. at 764.
105. Id. at 758.
106. Id. at 764.
107. Id.
108. Id. In Procanik, as in Berman, the court utilized the impact rule. See
Procanik, 478 A.2d at 758; Berman, 404 A.2d at 14. Yet the only direct injury to
the parents discussed by the Procanik court was the deprivation of their chance to
abort the fetus. Procanik, 478 A.2d at 758. It appears that both the Berman and
Procanik courts equated loss of a right with direct impact, when they found that
each plaintiff had a cause of action for emotional distress.




case of Lindenmuth v. Alperin 1o focused the court's attention on
the parameters of bystander recovery for medical malprac-
tice.' In Lindenmuth, the parents of a child who died three
days after birth from an intestinal obstruction sued for damages
resulting from the physician's negligent failure to diagnose and
treat the condition." 2 The New Jersey Superior Court dis-
missed the parents' claim for emotional distress, holding that it
did not meet the criteria set out in the Portee decision."13 Portee
required that to recover for negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress resulting from injury to another, one must prove, among
other things, that he observed the injury. 14 The superior court,
relying on the ruling in Portee,"1 found that "observation of the
injury .. . is crucial to [the] plaintiffs' claim." 1 6 Since the mis-
diagnosis in Lindenmuth was not an event that could be per-
ceived by the plaintiff, she could not recover for observing the
injury resulting from it." v
Because New Jersey courts had not dealt with the issue of
"whether misdiagnosis . . . can be equated with observing the
injury," 18 the Lindenmuth court also discussed two California
cases. 19 In Jansen v. Children's Hospital Center,120 the plaintiff
mother sued a hospital for emotional trauma and the alleged
resulting physical injury caused "by witnessing the progressive
decline and ultimate death of her daughter."' 21 The child's
death was caused by misdiagnosis that led to a massive gastro-
intestinal hemorrhage. 22 The court had to decide if the rule of
Dillon extended to a situation where the victim's injury did not
result from a direct impact, but rather, from the defendant's
110. 484 A.2d 1316 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984).
111. Id. at 1316-17.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. See supra text accompanying note 48.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 45-50.
116. Lindenmuth, 484 A.2d at 1317.
117. Id. at 1318.
118. Id. at 1317.
119. Id. The Lindenmuth court included in its discussion Justus v. Atchison,
565 P.2d 122 (Cal. 1977) and Jansen v. Children's Hosp. Ctr., 106 Cal. Rptr. 883
(Cal. Ct. App. 1973).
120. 106 Cal. Rptr. 883 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973).






failure to diagnose a medical condition.123 The court held that
the event causing injury to the child must itself be perceptible
and that a "failure of diagnosis... is not an event that can be
perceived by a layman."1 24 The Jansen court also noted that to
allow recovery in a situation where only the results of malprac-
tice were observed rather than the tortious act itself would lead
to "potentially infinite liability."125 Because of these considera-
tions, the Jansen court specifically refused to extend the Dillon
rule to include visibility of the result of the misdiagnosis rather
than observation of the tortious act itself as prescribed by Dil-
lon. 26 Heeding Dillon's counsel of moderation, the court re-
fused to broaden the law to include medical malpractice in
diagnosis.127
The second California case discussed by the Lindenmuth
court was Justus v. Atchison.1' It involved two cases brought
by two sets of parents against the same doctor and hospital for
the wrongful deaths of their unborn children during delivery. 129
The fathers, suing on their own behalf for their emotional
trauma caused by the stillbirths of their children, were denied
recovery.30 Each father was present in the delivery room dur-
ing the birth and each witnessed the stillbirth of his baby.' 3'
Although both of these occurrences were "relatively sudden,"
the court reasoned that Dillon requires more than "mere physi-
cal presence," and "the shock must also result from a 'direct
emotional impact' on the plaintiff caused by 'sensory contempo-
raneous observance of the accident.' "132 The court went on to
123. Id. "Dillon... sets up three guidelines for determining foreseeability of
injury to another than the person actually struck.... Th[e] language [of the guide-
lines] contemplates a sudden and brief event causing the child's injury." Id.
124. Id. at 885.
125. Id. (quoting Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 919 (Cal. 1968)).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. 565 P.2d 122 (Cal. 1977).
129. Id. at 124-25. The court noted that neither cause of action alleged the
precise nature of the fetal injuries. They did allege that complications arose in the
delivery of their respective babies. The complications involved the premature ex-
pulsion (in advance of the fetus) of the umbilical cord. "This event can cause fetal
death by compression of the cord between the fetus and the maternal pelvis." Id.
at 125 n.3.
130. Id. at 136.
131. Id. at 126 n.3, 135.




explain that as uninvolved spectators the husbands had no way
of knowing that the fetus had died until they were informed by
the doctor. l 3' The California Supreme Court held that under
the Dillon rule, the shock caused by hearing about an accident
and the resulting injury of a loved one after its occurrence, from
another person, will not support a cause of action for emotional
distress. 134
Two years after Lindenmuth was decided, the New Jersey
Superior Court extended the Dillon rule "to permit recovery for
negligent infliction of emotional distress when strict application
of the elements in Dillon" would have precluded recovery. 135
The issue on appeal in Polikoff v. Calabro,136 was "whether the
cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress, rec-
ognized by Portee v. Jaffee, 3 7 is available to a parent who
watches her child die as the result of medical malpractice."1 8
Audrey Polikoff, a six-year old, underwent two surgical pro-
cedures. 139 During the second procedure, the defendant, Dr.
Calabro, the anesthesiologist, inserted a catheter' 40 into Au-
drey's jugular vein.' 4 ' The catheter was to be used for hyperali-
mentation.142 The day after the surgery Audrey was doing well,
according to the nurses' records and her father's observations. 143
133. Id. at 135.
134. Id. at 135 (citing Dillon, 441 P.2d at 919-20).
135. Ropiequet, supra note 1, at 70.
136. 506 A.2d 1285 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986).
137. 417 A.2d 512, 528 (N.J. 1980). See supra notes 41-50 and accompanying
text.
138. Polikoff, 506 A.2d at 1286 (citing Portee, 417 A.2d at 528).
139. Id. The surgical procedures performed on Audrey were to relieve a duo-
denal obstruction. Id.
140. A catheter is "a tubular instrument for the passage of fluid from or into a
body cavity .... ." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 237 (5th Unabr. Lawyers' ed.
1982).
141. Polikoff, 506 A.2d at 1286. The jugular vein is "any of several veins of
the neck. The jugular veins receive blood from the head and neck and all converge
to form the innominate vein. The innominate veins terminate in the superior vena
cava, which opens into the upper posterior portion of the right atrium." 3 ENCY-
CLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 884 (15th ed. 1974).
142. Polikoff, 506 A.2d at 1286. Hyperalimentation is the "administration of
fluids containing essential nutrients through a venous catheter positioned in the
superior vena cava; therapy is continuous and permits total replacement of nutri-
tional needs at a slow rate, which minimizes overloading and excessive renal
losses." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 598 (3d Unabr. Lawyers' ed. 1972), cited
in Polikoff, 506 A.2d at 1286 n.1.




Mrs. Polikoff, Audrey's mother, visited Audrey that afternoon
and was present when hyperalimentation was started."' Au-
drey died two hours later from a "cardiac tamponade 145 secon-
dary to perforation of the central venous pressure catheter into
the pericardial sac."146 The hospital reports showed that "the
fluid which had accumulated [was] the hyperalimentation fluid
introduced through the catheter."147 Mrs. Polikoff, the plaintiff,
was with Audrey throughout the two hours that Audrey was in
distress and watched as teams of doctors and nurses tried to
resuscitate the child.1 After Audrey's death, Mrs. Polikoff was
under psychiatric care due to extreme emotional trauma."49
Dr. and Mrs. Polikoff sued both Dr. Calabro, the anesthesi-
ologist, and Dr. Panzarino, the surgeon, for negligence. 150 Dr.
Calabro moved for summary judgment, claiming that the plain-
tiff could not recover for emotional distress because she did not
satisfy the observation requirement of Portee.15' The trial court,
relying on Lindenmuth v. Alperin,152 granted defendant's mo-
tion.153 In reversing the lower court's decision, the Polikoff
court found Lindenmuth inapplicable to this case. 54 In the
court's opinion, Audrey died, not from the negligent insertion of
the catheter during surgery, but from the "introduction of
hyperalimentation fluid into the incorrectly placed catheter."-5
Therefore, the court held that Mrs. Polikoff could recover for
emotional distress, because she observed the infliction of the in-
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1287. Cardiac tamponade is "compression of the heart resulting
from accumulation of fluid within the pericardial sac." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL Dic-
TIONARY 1253 (3d Unabr. Lawyers' ed. 1972), cited in Polikoff, 506 A.2d at 1286
n.2.
146. Polikoff, 506 A.2d at 1287.
147. Id. at 1287 n.2.
148. Id. at 1287.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Polikoff, 506 A.2d at 1287 (citing Portee v. Jaffee, 471 A.2d 521 (N.J.
1980)). See supra text accompanying note 48.
152. 484 A.2d 1316 (N.J. Super Ct. Law Div. 1984). See supra notes 110-34
and accompanying text.






jury to her daughter and, thus, satisfied the observation re-
quirement of Portee.156
In Frame v. Kothari,157 parents brought an action to recover
for, among other things, their emotional distress which resulted
from their infant son's death.158 His death resulted from a mis-
diagnosis by the defendant doctor. 59 On January 22, 1982, the
plaintiffs' son fell down a flight of stairs in his home.160 He was
immediately taken to a health clinic where he was treated by
the defendant, Dr. Kothari.16 ' After examining the child, Dr.
Kothari told the parents that he had a virus. 162 She directed the
Frames to take the child home, and to wake him every four
hours to check for symptoms of a head injury. 63 Mr. Frame
claimed that when he called the defendant at 2:00 p.m. and told
her that the child's eyes were "'pivoting' or rolling in the eye
sockets," Dr. Kothari told them to let him sleep for four more
hours. 64 At 6:00 p.m., when the Frames tried to waken the
child, he was lifeless.16 5 They rushed him to the hospital "where
x-rays revealed a blood clot at the rear of his skull."66 Emer-
gency surgery was performed, but the child died during the
night.16 7 "The cause of death was an intra-cerebellar hemor-
rhage 16 due to a blunt trauma to the skull."69
After the child's death, Mrs. Frame suffered from night-
mares and insomnia. 70 She was under the care of a psychia-
trist, who diagnosed her ailment as "a chronic post-traumatic
stress disorder" and attributed her illness to "the events sur-
156. Id.
157. 560 A.2d 675 (N.J. 1989).






164. Id. at 676-77.
165. Id. at 677.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Intra-cerebellar hemorrhage is the "extravasation of blood within the
brain substance." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DIcTIoNARY 637 (5th Unabr. Lawyers' ed.
1982). Extravasation is "to pass out of a vessel into tissues." Id. at 502.





rounding the loss of her son."171 After a trial, the jury awarded
each parent $500 for emotional distress.172 The appellate court
reversed the award, holding "that to impose liability where the
malpractice merely consists of an improper diagnosis will result
in too great a cost to society and have a profoundly deleterious
impact on the medical profession to the detriment of our society
as a whole."173
In considering whether medical misdiagnosis would sup-
port a claim for infliction of emotional distress, the New Jersey
Supreme Court noted that the only basis for the Frames' emo-
tional distress claim was [the doctor's] alleged negligence in
failing "to tell the Frames in their 2:00 p.m. telephone conversa-
tion" to bring their child to the hospital. 174 The court went on to
discuss the standard of recovery required by Portee v. Jaffee175
and the holdings in Polikoff v. Calabro76 and Giardina v.
Bennett.177
The court noted that the parents in Giardina could recover
because "the experience of pregnancy and child birth itself con-
stitutes the immediacy and presence . . . that was stressed in
Portee."178  In distinguishing Giardina, the Frame court
asserted:
Diagnosis is an intellectual undertaking, requiring the physician
to analyze symptoms and reach a conclusion. The nature of a mis-
diagnosis is such that its results may neither manifest themselves
immediately nor be shocking. Hours, days, or months may sepa-
rate a misdiagnosis, the manifestation of the injury to the patient,
and the family member's observation of the injury. Thus, the
171. Id.
172. Frame v. Kothari, 528 A.2d at 86 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987).
173. Id. at 91.
174. Frame, 560 A.2d at 677.
175. 417 A.2d 521 (N.J. 1980)). See supra text accompanying notes 47-50.
176. 506 A.2d 1285 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986)). See supra text accompa-
nying note 156.
177. Frame, 560 A.2d at 677-78 (citing Giardina v. Bennett, 545 A.2d 139
(N.J. 1988)). In Giardina, plaintiffs could not recover under the wrongful death
statute for the stillbirth of their baby caused by malpractice, but had a cognizable
claim for the emotional distress this caused. Giardina, 545 A.2d at 139. See also
infra notes 231-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of Giardina.
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event may not cause the simultaneous concurrence or rapid se-
quence of events associated with a shocking event. 179
The court also recognized that other jurisdictions'8 0 held that
"one family member should not recover for emotional distress
resulting from the misdiagnosis of another family member, at
least in the absence of a close temporal connection between the
misdiagnosis and the injury, as well as the contemporaneous
observation of the injury by the family member."' 8 '
The New Jersey Supreme Court thus denied recovery for
the emotional distress suffered by the Frames because the mis-
diagnosis did not manifest an immediate injury to their son and
the chain of events spanning eleven hours until the child's
death, "although deeply tragic, were not 'shocking.'"182 The
concurring opinion suggested that "the cost to society of ex-
panding medical malpractice liability to allow a family member
to recover for his ... emotional distress as a result of a physi-
cian's improper diagnosis will outweigh the benefits to
society."'l 3
The courts in the cases discussed above basically adhered
to the Dillon rule and required that its criteria be met before
recovery would be allowed.
179. Id.
180. E.g., Budavari v. Barry, 222 Cal. Rptr. 446 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (denying
recovery to wife when her husband's cancer was not diagnosed until it was termi-
nal); Jansen v. Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr., 106 Cal. Rptr. 883 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973)
(denying recovery to a mother for emotional distress caused by her daughter's
death from undiagnosed gastrointestinal hemorrhage); Amodio v. Cunningham,
438 A.2d 6 (Conn. 1980) (denying recovery to a mother for emotional distress re-
sulting from her doctor's failure to diagnose and treat child's respiratory problem);
Williams v. Baker, 540 A.2d 449 (D.C. 1988) (denying recovery to a mother for
emotional distress arising from misdiagnosis of her son's serious illness); Pate v.
Children's Hosp., 404 N.W.2d 632 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (denying recovery to sister
for emotional distress caused by defendant's failure to diagnose pneumonia which
resulted in the patient's death); Wilson v. Galt, 668 P.2d 1104 (N.M. Ct. App.)
(denying parents recovery for emotional distress resulting from the failure of doc-
tors to diagnose bilirubin encephalopathy in their newborn son, which caused
brain damage to the child), cert. quashed, 668 P.2d 308 (N.M. 1983).
181. Frame, 560 A.2d at 679.
182. Id. at 681.
183. Id. at 682 (Garibaldi, J., concurring).
19
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D. The Direct Victim Rule
An early definition offered for the direct victim principle
stated:
A "direct victim" does not have to be a contemporaneous,
percipient witness suffering a direct and substantial shock to the
nervous system from observation of harm caused to a loved one.
Instead, the victim is the "direct" target of the malpractice or
other negligent act and accordingly is permitted to recover for his
psychological injuries. The most important feature of the direct
victim rule is that the plaintiff is no longer considered a bystander
184
In 1980, the California Supreme Court, in deciding Molien
v. Kaiser Foundation Hospital,8 5 substantially extended the re-
quirements established in Dillon. The issue in Molien was
whether damages could be recovered for negligent infliction of
emotional distress without the occurrence of any physical
injury.186
Mrs. Molien, after having a routine physical, was incor-
rectly diagnosed as having contracted syphilis. 87 She under-
went treatment for the disease, which included massive doses of
penicillin.8 8 As a result of the erroneous diagnosis, Mrs. Molien
accused her husband of having extramarital sexual activity,
which created difficulties in their marriage. 8 9 This led to the
"initiation of dissolution proceedings."190 Subsequently, Mr.
Molien instituted a complaint alleging loss of marital consor-
tium and emotional distress.'9 '
In its decision, the court found that Dillon was not control-
ling.192 It distinguished Dillon from the instant case by finding
that Mrs. Dillon "sought recovery of damages she suffered as a
percipient witness to the injury of a third person," 193 whereas
Mr. Molien was "himself a direct victim of the assertedly negli-
184. Ropiequet, supra note 1, at 75.
185. 616 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980).
186. Id. at 814.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 814-15.
190. Id. at 815.
191. Id.
192. Id.




gent act."194 The court found that the significance of Dillon in
this case was "its general principle of foreseeability," 195 rather
than its guidelines. 196 Based on its judgment that the defend-
ant knew or should have known that the defendant's misdiagno-
sis would cause Mr. Molien emotional distress, 197 the California
Supreme Court sanctioned recovery for negligently caused emo-
tional distress unaccompanied by physical injury.198 The court
held that "because the risk of harm to [Mr. Molien] was reason-
ably foreseeable, . . . under these circumstances defendants
owed plaintiff a duty to exercise due care in diagnosing the
physical condition of his wife." 199 Although, the Molien court
did not establish criteria for determining when a plaintiff is a
direct victim,200 the California Supreme Court subsequently de-
fined direct victim as a "person whose emotional distress is a
reasonably foreseeable consequence of the conduct of the
defendant."20'
In 1989, the California Supreme Court, en banc, reconsid-
ered its standards for awarding damages for negligent infliction
of emotional distress, when it reviewed Thing v. La Chusa.202
In Thing, the mother of a child struck by an automobile sought
damages for emotional distress she suffered when she arrived
at the scene after the accident. 20 3 She did not see or hear the
accident and became aware of it only when told by her daughter
what had transpired. 204 Mrs. Thing, basing her argument on
Molien, claimed that she was a direct victim of the defendant's
negligence. 2 5 The court denied recovery and reaffirmed the va-
lidity of adhering to the dictates of the Dillon rule. 2°6 The Cali-




197. Id. at 815.
198. Id. at 815, 823.
199. Id. at 817.
200. Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 823 (Cal. 1989). The Molien court
stated that Mr. Molien, the plaintiff, was "a direct victim of the assertedly negli-
gent act." Molien, 616 P.2d at 816.
201. Thing, 771 P.2d at 823.
202. 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989).
203. Id. at 816.
204. Id. at 815.
205. Id.




limitation was abandoned in Dillon as an arbitrary restriction
on recovery, the Dillon guidelines have been relaxed on grounds
that they, too, created arbitrary limitations on recovery."207
This relaxation only served to muddy the water as the right to
recover for emotional distress was expanded and the require-
ments of physical injury and physical manifestation of the
mental distress were abandoned.208 "The subtleties in the dis-
tinction between the right to recover as a 'bystander' and as a
'direct victim' created ... an 'amorphous nether realm'. .. ."209
The court concluded:
[Tihe societal benefits of certainty in the law, as well as tradi-
tional concepts of tort law, dictate the limitation of bystander re-
covery of damages or emotional distress. In the absence of
physical injury or impact to the plaintiff himself, damages for
emotional distress should be recoverable only if the plaintiff: (1) is
closely related to the injury victim; (2) is present at the scene of
the injury-producing event at the time it occurs and is then aware
that it is causing injury to the victim; and (3) as a result suffers
emotional distress beyond that which would be anticipated in a
disinterested witness.210
Three years after Thing, the California Supreme Court, re-
viewing Burgess v. Superior Court,211 acknowledged that "the
confusion in applying the rules for bystander and direct victim
recovery . . .can be traced to [the] court's decision in Molien
which first used the 'direct victim' label."2 12 The issue in Bur-
gess was whether a mother could recover under the direct vic-
tim rule for emotional distress resulting from the negligent
delivery of her baby boy or, if her claim had to be considered
utilizing the bystander rule.
Mrs. Burgess went into labor and was admitted to the hos-
pital. 213 After the obstetrician artificially broke Mrs. Burgess'
membranes (water), the umbilical cord compressed.21 4 Mrs.
207. Id. at 821.
208. Id. at 824.
209. Id. at 823.
210. Id. at 815.
211. 831 P.2d 1197 (Cal. 1992).
212. Id. at 1201.
213. Id. at 1198.
214. Id. When the umbilical cord compresses, it is known as a prolapsed cord.




Burgess was aware that something was wrong as she was pre-
pared for an emergency Cesarean section. 215 The baby, de-
prived of oxygen through his umbilical cord for about forty-four
minutes, suffered permanent brain damage, as well as damage
to his nervous system.216 The baby subsequently died, allegedly
as a result of the injuries sustained at birth.21 7
Mrs. Burgess sued her obstetrician for, among other things,
emotional distress caused by his negligence. 2' 8 Her obstetrician
argued that Mrs. Burgess did not meet the requirements set
forth in Thing v. La Chusa219 and, therefore, could not recover
for emotional distress.220 The court held that Mrs. Burgess was
not a bystander, but rather a direct victim and hence, the Thing
decision did not apply.221 The court went on to note that "[iun
cases involving family relationships and medical treatment,
confusion has reigned as to whether and under which 'theory'
plaintiffs may seek damages for negligently inflicted emotional
distress."222 In explaining the difference between the two theo-
ries, the court reaffirmed that recovery for negligent infliction of
emotional distress requires proof of the traditional negligence
elements of duty, breach of that duty, causation, and dam-
ages223 and noted that "[tihe distinction between 'bystander'
and 'direct victim' cases is found in the source of the duty owed
by the defendant to the plaintiffs."224
The court explained that bystander cases originate when
negligent behavior by the defendant causes physical injury or
emotional distress to a plaintiff with whom the defendant had
no prior relationship and to whom he did not owe a specific duty
of care. 225 On the other hand, the "direct victim" rule is used
when the defendant breaches a duty owed to the plaintiff that
LOUISELL & HAROLD WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 17G.18[2][c] (1991); F.
GARY CUNNINGHAM ET AL., WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 680 (18th ed. 1989)).
215. Burgess, 831 P.2d at 1198.
216. Id. at 1199.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989). See supra text accompanying note 210.
220. Burgess, 831 P.2d at 1199.
221. Id.
222. Id.
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the defendant has assumed, which is "imposed on the defendant
as a matter of law, or that arises out of a relationship between
the two."226 The court went on to state that liability for mal-
practice arises where there is a doctor-patient relationship be-
tween the plaintiff and the defendant giving rise to a duty of
care. 227 The court applied the test enunciated in Thompson v.
County of Alameda,22 in order to establish whether a duty of
care did in fact exist between the defendant and the plaintiff
and her fetus.229 Because Mrs. Burgess' doctor clearly owed her
a duty of care, the court held that Mrs. Burgess was a "direct
victim" of his negligence and therefore she was entitled to re-
cover for the emotional distress caused by the negligent delivery
of the baby.3 0
The New Jersey Supreme Court, although not stating so,
applied the direct victim rule when it decided Giardina v. Ben-
nett.231 The sole issue on appeal was whether parents could re-
cover under the Wrongful Death Act 23 2 for the stillbirth of their
226. Id. at 1201.
227. Id. at 1202. The duty of care required from doctors is the knowledge and
use of skill and care ordinarily possessed and used by similarly situated members
of the profession. PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 24, § 32, at 187-89.
228. 614 P.2d 728, 732-33 (Cal. 1980).
229. Burgess, 831 P.2d at 1205. Factors to be considered to establish the
existence of a duty are:
the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the
plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defend-
ant's conduct and the injury suffered [by the plaintiff], the moral blame at-
tached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the
extent of the burden to the defendant and the consequences to the commu-
nity of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for a breach,
and the availability, cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.
Id. (quoting Christensen v. Superior Court, 820 P.2d 181, 190 (Ca. 1991) (quoting
Thompson v. County of Alameda, 614 P.2d 728, 732-33 (Cal. 1980) (quoting Roland
v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 563 (Cal. 1968) (en banc)))).
230. Id. at 1200, 1208-09.
231. 545 A.2d 139 (N.J. 1988)
232. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:31-1 (West 1987). An action for wrongful death lies:
[w]hen the death of a person is caused by a wrongful act, neglect or default,
such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the person injured to
maintain an action for damages resulting from the injury, the person who
would have been liable in damages for the injury if death had not ensued
shall be liable in an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the
person injured and although the death was caused under circumstances
amounting in law to a crime.
280
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol15/iss1/9
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child caused by the alleged malpractice of the defendant doc-
tor.2 3 The plaintiff, Mrs. Giardina, was due to deliver her baby
on May 19, 1983.234 When she was two weeks overdue, the de-
fendant doctor ordered a "non-stress test" and found no
problems.23 5 During the next nine days, Mrs. Giardina had pe-
riodic contractions and was examined twice by Dr. Bennett.23 6
The doctor considered Mrs. Giardina's symptoms normal and
refused to perform a Cesarean section.237 On June 12, the
plaintiff entered the hospital in labor.23 The obstetric staff
could not detect a fetal heartbeat.239 The defendant subse-
quently confirmed the baby's death and induced labor. 240 On
June 13, the baby was stillborn.2 1 The plaintiffs sued Dr. Ben-
nett for malpractice under the Wrongful Death Act. 242 Follow-
ing the New Jersey Supreme Court's ruling in Graf v.
Taggert,23 the trial court granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment and the appellate court affirmed.24
Although the New Jersey Supreme Court also held that the
plaintiffs could not recover under the Wrongful Death statute, it
felt compelled to consider "how [the New Jersey] tort system
should respond to the negligently caused death of a fetus."2
5
The Supreme Court, in discussing prior New Jersey deci-
sions including Berman v. Allan,24 Procanik v. Cillo,247 Portee
233. Giardina, 525 A.2d at 139.









243. 204 A.2d 140 (N.J. 1964) (denying recovery to a pregnant mother in-
volved in an automobile accident with defendant, which resulted in injury to the
fetus and subsequent stillbirth, reasoning that there could be no recovery for the
death of an unborn child).
244. Giardina, 545 A.2d at 140. In affirming the summary judgement for the
defendant in Graf, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that "due to the 'uniformly
speculative' nature of damages, a wrongful death action could not be maintained
with respect to the pre-birth death of an infant." Id. (citing Graf, 204 A.2d at 145).
245. Giardina, 545 A.2d at 139.
246. 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979); see supra notes 57-69 and accompanying text.
247. 478 A.2d 755 (N.J. 1984); see supra notes 90-108 and accompanying text.
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v. Jaffee,24 and Friel v. Vineland Obstetrical and Gynecological
Professional Ass'n,249 found "a critical element in this spectrum
of cases [was] the intimate family relationship between the
claimant and the immediate victim." 250 The court also estab-
lished that in Giardina, the plaintiff's pregnancy and childbirth
were sufficient to take the place of the immediacy and presence
of the claimant as prescribed by Portee,251 and was sufficient to
assure the "genuineness of the resulting emotional injury and
mental anguish."252 The court concluded that "the wrong com-
mitted by a doctor in negligently causing the pre-birth death of
an infant constitutes a tort against the parents."253 Although
the court denied recovery for wrongful death, it stated that the
Giardinas could recover for the emotional distress they suffered
as a result of the defendant's malpractice. 254
III. Carey v. Lovett
A. Facts
During the summer of 1983, the plaintiff, Jo Ann Carey, a
diabetic, became pregnant for the third time in four years. 255
Her treating physicians were Dr. John Osler, III, an internist,
and Dr. William E. Lovett Jr., an obstetrician and gynecolo-
gist.256 Mrs. Carey had been treated by both doctors for some
time and, therefore, they were familiar with her medical his-
tory.257 Mrs. Carey's first child was born one month prema-
ture[ly] and suffered from toxemia.258 Her second pregnancy
ended in a miscarriage. 259 On October 9, 1983, during the
twenty-sixth week of her third pregnancy, Mrs. Carey awoke
248. 417 A.2d 521 (N.J. 1980); see supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text.
249. 400 A.2d 147 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. 1979); see supra notes 70-89 and
accompanying text.
250. Giardina, 545 A.2d at 142.
251. Id. at 142-43. See supra text accompanying note 48.
252. Giardina, 545 A.2d at 143.
253. Id. at 142.
254. Id. at 139.
255. Carey v. Lovett, 622 A.2d 1279, 1282 (N.J. 1993).
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. Toxemia is a term that refers to "metabolic disorders of pregnancy
characterized by hypertension, edema, and albuminuria.' STEDMAN'S MEDICAL
DICTIONARY 1464 (5th Unabr. Lawyers' ed. 1982).




feeling ill.260 After testing her blood sugar level and finding it
elevated, Mrs. Carey drank bouillon all day and increased her
dosage of insulin.261 Still feeling ill the following morning, Mrs.
Carey called Dr. Osler's office at 8:30 a.m. 2 2
According to Dr. Osler, he tried to return Mrs. Carey's call
during the day at least twice from his office and twice from the
hospital.26 3 Each time he called, the line was busy or there was
no answer.26 4 When Dr. Osler finally reached Mrs. Carey, it
was 10:00 p.m. that evening.265 In response to his questioning,
Mrs. Carey told Dr. Osler that she had not tested her urine for
ketones. 266 Dr. Osler claimed he told Mrs. Carey to go to the
hospital immediately, but she refused.267 Nurse Kathleen Mc-
Donald, who was with Dr. Osler when he called Mrs. Carey, cor-
roborated his story when she testified at trial. 68 However,
Mrs. Carey asserted that Dr. Osler instructed her to report to
the hospital the next morning, October 11.269 Although Mr. Ca-
rey was present when Dr. Osler called, he testified that he had
not heard the conversation because he had not been paying at-
tention.270 At trial, it was undisputed that after the 10:00 p.m.




263. Brief for Defendants-Appellants, John H. Osler, III, M.D. and John H.
Osler, III, M.D., P.A. at 8, Carey v. Lovett, No. A-2754-89T2, A-2548-89T2, slip op.
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 5, 1991) [hereinafter Defendant Osler's App. Div.
Brief].
264. Id.
265. Carey, 622 A.2d at 1282.
266. Defendant Osler's App. Div. Brief, supra note 263, at 8.
According to the doctor, the presence of ketones in the urine indicates either
a state of starvation or ketoacidosis. Doctor Osler testified that it is his pol-
icy for diabetic patients to test for ketones "automatically". . . [since] it is
simple to accomplish and can be done [by the patient at home] at any time of
the day or night. If ketones are found in the urine, then the patient is to
either contact the doctor directly or report to the hospital.
Id. at 8-9.
267. Id. at 9. Since Dr. Osler was already at the hospital, he wanted Mrs.
Carey to meet him there so that he could examine her and take the necessary steps
to treat her. Mrs. Carey declined because she did not want to travel to the hospital
at that time and felt that she was not ill enough to require that action. Id.
268. Id. at 9-10.
269. Carey, 622 A.2d at 1282.




West Jersey Hospital on October 11.271 Dr. Osler testified that
he left a message with Dr. Lovett's answering service informing
him of the arrangements, yet Dr. Lovett contended he never re-
ceived the message. 272
On October 11, Mrs. Carey was admitted to the hospital at
1:00 p.m. and was examined at 2:30 p.m. by Dr. Gerard, an in-
ternist and associate of Dr. Osler's.273 After examining Mrs. Ca-
rey, Dr. Gerard made the diagnosis of diabetic ketoacidosis,
274
which frequently causes intrauterine death.275 He also noted
that she was experiencing intermittent contractions. 276 Addi-
tionally, Dr. Gerard was unable to detect a fetal heartbeat.
277
In order to treat the ketoacidosis, Dr. Gerard ordered blood
tests, intravenous fluids and, later, the administration of insu-
lin.278 The hospital called Dr. Lovett at 3:00 p.m. to report Dr.
Gerard's findings. 279 Dr. Lovett made a "tentative diagnosis of
fetal demise."2 0
At 3:30 p.m., Mrs. Carey went into labor and was trans-
ferred to the hospital's labor and delivery area.28 ' Her labor
progressed and all attempts by the attending nurses to find a
fetal heartbeat were unsuccessful. 28 2 During this time, nothing
was done to arrest Mrs. Carey's labor.283 At 5:00 p.m., the
nurses called Mr. Carey and Dr. Lovett to report on Mrs. Ca-
rey's condition. 284 Dr. Lovett instructed the nurses to allow
Mrs. Carey to deliver the expected stillborn and ordered them to
administer pain killing drugs.285
271. Carey, 622 A.2d at 1282.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. Ketoacidosis is defined "diabetic acidosis, caused by the enhanced
production of ketone bodies." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 745 (5th Unabr.
Lawyers' ed. 1982). Acidosis is defined as "a condition in which the acidity of body
fluids and tissues is abnormally high." BANTAM MEDICAL DICTIONARY 4 (1990).
275. Carey, 622 A.2d at 1282.
276. Id. at 1283.
277. Id.
278. Defendant Osler's App. Div. Brief, supra note 263, at 13.










Mr. and Mrs Carey were informed by the attending obstet-
ric nurses that there was no fetal heartbeat and that the fetus
was dead. 2 6 Mrs. Carey, however, insisted that the fetus was
alive because she could feel it moving.28 7 She continued to
maintain its viability despite the nurses' repeated insistence
that the baby was dead. 288
At 7:45 p.m., Mrs. Carey was injected with Pitocin 28 9 to in-
duce her labor. At 8:30 p.m., a nurse broke Mrs. Carey's water
in order to speed the delivery.29o At 9:06 p.m., Mrs. Carey deliv-
ered the baby in a breech position.291 Two nurses were the only
hospital personnel present at the birth and neither assisted in
the delivery, causing the baby to drop "unsupported onto the
labor bed."292 Although the baby was born alive, and was pink
at birth,293 no one realized that she was alive until she was
"placed on the weighing scale [and] gasped for air."294 The in-
fant was then rushed to the nursery. 295 At this point, Dr. Lovett
arrived and told Mrs. Carey that the baby was alive, but very
sick.296
Dr. Costarino, a perinatologist 297 and neonatologist, 298 was
summoned to examine the baby.299 "When he arrived, the baby
was limp and blue [and] [h]e could not hear any heartbeat."3°°




289. Id. Pitocin, a trade name for the drug oxytocin, is a "hormone, released
by the pituitary gland that causes increased contraction of the womb during labor
...." BANTAm MEDICAL DICTIONARY 313 (1990).
290. Carey, 622 A.2d at 1283.
291. Id. The breech presentation is defined as a "position of a baby in the
womb such that it is delivered buttocks first .... This type of delivery increases
the risk of damage to the baby." BANTAM MEDICAL DICTIONARY 57 (1990).
292. Carey, 622 A.2d at 1283.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 1284.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Perinatal refers to "the period from about 3 months before birth to 1
month after birth." BANTAm MEDICAL DICTIONARY 326 (1990).
298. Neonate refers to "an infant at any time during the first four weeks of
life." BANTAM MEDICAL DICTIONARY 288 (1990).





color returned and a heartbeat was detected.30' Dr. Costarino
treated the baby with drugs to counteract the pain killers that
had been given to Mrs. Carey, placed the baby on a ventilator,
and administered antibiotics. 30 2 Later that night the baby was
transferred to Children's Hospital in Philadelphia. 30 3
Two days later, "the doctors at Children's Hospital discov-
ered that the baby was hemorrhaging from both sides of her
brain."30 4 Mr. Carey was informed that the baby was severely
brain damaged and was not expected to live much longer30 5 On
October 21, the baby was still alive, but in a vegetative state
with no chance of improvement.30 6 The Careys decided to dis-
connect the baby from life support machines.30 7 The baby died
that day.308
Dr. Bowen, Director of Newborn Pediatrics at Pennsylvania
Hospital, testified as an expert for the Careys at trial on the
issue of proximate causation. 30 9 In Dr. Bowen's opinion, the
proximate cause of the baby's death was "prematurity compli-
cated by perinatal asphyxia."310 He testified that the asphyxia
was caused by "Jo Ann Carey's ketoacidosis being corrected by
insulin too quickly."311
Mr. and Mrs. Carey visited Dr. Janet Berson, a clinical psy-
chologist, on December 20, 1983.312 Mrs. Carey complained of a
recurrence of migraine headaches, from which she had suffered
for ten to fifteen years, tenseness, and fits of crying.3 13 Mrs. Ca-









309. Brief for Defendant-Appellant, William E. Lovett, Jr., M.D. at 21, Carey
v. Lovett, No. A-2754-89T2, slip op. (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 5, 1991) [here-
inafter Defendant Lovett's App. Div. Briefi.
310. Id. Asphyxia is "a life threatening condition in which oxygen is pre-
vented from reaching the tissues by obstruction of or damage to any part of the
respiratory system.... Brain cells cannot live for more than about four minutes
without oxygen." BArAm MEDICAL DICTIONARY 34 (1990).
311. Defendant Lovett's App. Div. Brief, supra note 309, at 22.





ten times between December, 1983 and June, 1984.314 By May,
Mrs. Carey was pregnant and Dr. Berson noted that she was
"much improved."315 Mr. Carey saw Dr. Berson only once after
the initial visit.316
B. Procedural History
Mr. and Mrs. Carey sued Drs. Lovett and Osler, among
others, for alleged malpractice, which resulted in the death of
their infant daughter. 317 Their suit for malpractice against Dr.
Osler was based on his alleged negligent failure to instruct Mrs.
Carey to go to the hospital immediately, instead of instructing
her to go to the hospital the next morning.31 8 According to the
plaintiffs, Dr. Lovett was negligent in two respects: his failure
to come to the hospital to examine Mrs. Carey personally 319 and
his misdiagnosis of Mrs. Carey's condition as "fetal demise"
based on Dr. Gerard's finding no fetal heartbeat.320 Before and
during the trial, the court granted motions to dismiss some de-
fendants. 32' The jury returned a verdict against Drs. Lovett
and Osler.3 22 The doctors moved for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict, a new trial, or remittitur.323 The court denied these
motions and defendants appealed.3 24
The Superior Court, Appellate Division, reversed in an un-




317. Carey, 622 A.2d at 1284. "The Careys, individually and as general ad-
ministrators and administrators ad prosequendum, sued Drs. Lovett and Osler,
certain other physicians, as well as various nurses, hospital administrators, and
the manufacturers of the fetal monitors." Id.
318. Id.
319. Defendant Osler's App. Div. Brief, supra note 263, at 18.
320. Brief and Appendix for Amicus Curiae Medical Society of New Jersey at
4, Carey v. Lovett, 622 A.2d 1279 (N.J. Apr. 6, 1993) (No. 34,210).
321. Carey, 622 A.2d at 1284. "All defendants were dismissed by various pre-
trial motions, except Drs. Lovett, Osler, Gerard, and Pathikonda, West Jersey Hos-
pital," and five nurses. During the trial, Dr. Pathikonda and two nurses were dis-
missed as defendants. Defendant Osler's App. Div. Brief, supra note 263, at 1.
322. Carey, 622 A.2d at 1284.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 1282; see Carey v. Lovett, No. A-2754-8972, A-2458-89T2, slip op.




Kothari,326 that the trial court should not have considered the
parents' claims as direct claims as stated in Giardina, but
rather, as indirect or "bystander" claims, 327 as in the Frame
case. 328 Relying on the Frame decision, the Appellate Division
found that the Careys had no cause of action.329 The Careys
appealed.330
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
parents could recover for their emotional distress caused by
medical malpractice in the birth and death of their daughter,331
that the charge to the jury as to the father's claim for emotional
distress was erroneous,332 and that the awards were exces-
sive.333 The case was remanded for a trial on both liability and
damages.3 4
C. The Carey Decision
The issue in the Carey appeal was "whether parents, with-
out attempting to prove any physical injury to themselves, may
recover for their emotional distress caused by medical malprac-
tice resulting in the premature birth and death of their
baby."33 5 In reviewing Carey, the New Jersey Supreme Court
discussed the evolution of recovery for emotional distress claims
in New Jersey.336 It acknowledged the development of two lines
of cases: those where the claimant herself is injured, as evi-
denced by Berman v. Allan,33 7 and those where the claimant's
emotional distress arises from injury to another,3 38 as in Portee
326. 560 A.2d. 675, 681 (N.J. 1989); see supra notes 157-83 and accompanying
text.
327. Carey, 622 A.2d at 1282; see Carey v. Lovett, No A-2654-8972, A-2458-
89T2, slip op. at 14-16 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 5, 1991).
328. Carey, 622 A.2d at 1281.
329. Carey, 622 A.2d at 1282; see Carey v. Lovett, No. A-2754-8972, A- 2458-
89T2, slip op. at 14-16 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div 1991).
330. Carey, 622 A.2d at 1282.
331. Id. at 1292.
332. Id. at 1288.
333. Id. at 1292.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 1284.
336. Id. at 1284-86.
337. Id. at 1284-85; see Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 10-11 (N.J. 1979); see
also supra notes 57-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of Berman.




v. Jaffeee.339 Although injury resulting from medical misdiagno-
sis or malpractice may be the basis for recovery under either
theory, the court noted:
[It is only] under limited circumstances that the medical misdiag-
nosis of one member of a family member may entitle another
member to recover for his or her own emotional distress. ... [Re-
covery is] limited.., to the 'observation of shocking events .... '
With medical malpractice claims, we have required that
claimants observe contemporaneously the act of malpractice and
the resultant injury. 340
Referring to Giardina v. Bennett341, the court maintained that
"the experience of pregnancy and childbirth itself constitutes
the immediacy and presence of the claimant in the face of in-
flicted personal injury or death of a loved one that was stressed
in Portee."342 These requirements in bystander cases serve to
"assure the genuineness of the resulting emotional injury and
mental anguish."343 The court found that because the mother
and fetus are so interconnected, the mother is more than a by-
stander and, therefore, "an injury to the fetus could be viewed
as supporting a direct parental claim for emotional distress
.... " 344 It concluded that the close mother-fetal relationship
eliminates the need for the presence and the need to fulfill the
contemporaneous observation requirements of a bystander
claim for emotional distress.345 The requirement that the emo-
tional distress be severe is "a sufficient guaranty of genuineness
to substitute for physical injury to the claimant, which until
now has been an element of a direct claim for emotional dis-
tress."346 Although the New Jersey Supreme Court found that
the Careys had a "direct" cause of action for their emotional dis-
tress, it remanded the case for a new trial on both liability and
339. Id. at 1285; see Portee v. Jaffee, 417 A.2d 521, 527-28 (N.J. 1980); see also
supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text.
340. Carey, 622 A.2d at 1285, 1286 (citations omitted).
341. 545 A.2d 139 (N.J. 1988). See supra notes 231-54 and accompanying
text.
342. Id. at 1285 (quoting Giardina, 545 A.2d at 143).
343. Id. at 1285-86.
344. Id. at 1286.





damages. 347 After a review of the record, the New Jersey
Supreme Court agreed with the Appellate Division that the
trial court "had lost its sense of impartiality... and had tilted
impermissibly in favor of the plaintiffs."348 This bias was evi-
denced by the trial court's constant intrusions, reprimands, and
restrictions aimed against the defense.3 49 The New Jersey
Supreme Court found that "the court removed from the jury's
consideration its determination of the nature of the parents'
emotional distress and the extent to which their distress was
related to the conduct of each defendant."350 Additionally, it
found that the awards made by the jury were excessive, attrib-
uting the verdict to "prejudice, partiality or passion," which
tainted the entire verdict.351 In ordering a new trial, it noted
that the absence of any evidence of psychiatric hospitalization
or significant interference with the lifestyle or employment rela-
tionships of either Mr. or Mrs. Carey precluded the substantial
recoveries awarded by the jury.352
IV. Analysis
In light of the rules established in prior New Jersey case
law addressing negligent infliction of emotional distress, 53 the
New Jersey Supreme Court's holding in Carey v. Lovett consti-
tutes a substantial extension of negligence law.354 Although the
holding of the case reflects application of the direct victim
rule, 355 the New Jersey Suprem Court ignored the traditional
elements for recovery in negligence, 56 did not address the issue
347. Id. at 1292.
348. Id. at 1288, 1289.
349. Id. at 1289.
350. Id. at 1290.
351. Id. at 1291.
352. Id. at 1290.
353. See supra part H.C.
354. Carey represents a direct extension of New Jersey law in that the New
Jersey Supreme Court effectively used the "direct victim" rule without the key ele-
ment of foreseeability. See infra text accompanying notes 356-57. Additionally,
the New Jersey Supreme Court would have had to extend existing law even to
allow the Careys to recover under a bystander theory, since it did not require the
third Portee element, observation of the injury rather than of the result. See infra
text accompanying notes 420-28.
355. See supra part II.D.
356. The traditional elements necessary for recovery in negligence are: a duty,
requiring a person to behave in a way that protects others from unreasonable risk;
290 [Vol. 15:257
34http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol15/iss1/9
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of proximate cause35 7 or the requirement of foreseeability. The
only testimony on the issue of proximate cause was offered by
Dr. Bowen, the plaintiff's expert witness.3 58 Dr. Bowen testified
that the Carey baby died from "prematurity complicated by per-
inatal asphyxia[tion]," which was caused by Mrs. Carey's
"ketoacidosis [having been] corrected by insulin too quickly."359
His testimony did not establish a causative link between the
actions of Drs. Lovett and Osler and the death of the baby.360
Neither of them treated Mrs. Carey in the hospital nor pre-
scribed the increased insulin dosage.361 In addition, Dr.
Bowen's testimony did not show that Dr. Lovett's alleged
deviation from a standard of care362 caused the prematurity or
breach of duty, failure to adhere to the required standard of care; proximate cause,
a causal connection between the breach of duty and the injury; and actual loss or
damage. PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 24, § 30, at 164-65.
357. Proximate cause is a basic element of a plaintiff's cause of action for neg-
ligence. "[Tihere [must] be some reasonable connection between the defendant's
act or omission and the damage which the plaintiff has suffered." PROSSER ON
TORTS, supra note 24, § 41, at 263. "[Llegal responsibility must be limited to those
causes which are so closely connected with the result and of such significance that
the law is justified in imposing liability." Id. § 41, at 264. There are two compo-
nents to proximate cause, causation of fact and legal cause. Causation of fact is
based on the premise that "an act or omission is not regarded as a cause of an
event if the particular event would have occurred without it." Id. § 41, at 265. The
plaintiff bears the burden of proving causation in fact. Id. § 41, at 269. "A mere
possibility of such causation is not enough; and when the matter remains one of
pure speculation or conjecture, . . . it becomes the duty of the court to direct a
verdict for the defendant. Where the conclusion is not one within common knowl-
edge, expert testimony may provide a sufficient basis for it...." Id. Legal cause
requires that "the scope of liability should ordinarily extend to but not beyond" the
scope of foreseeable risks. Id. § 42, at 273. Under this theory, "the defendant is
liable only if the harm suffered is the 'natural and probable' consequence of the
defendant's act." Id. § 43, at 282.
358. Defendant Lovett's App. Div. Brief, supra note 309, at 21; see also supra
text accompanying note 309.
359. Defendant Lovett's App. Div. Brief, supra note 309, at 21; see also supra
text accompanying notes 310-11.
360. Defendant Lovett's App. Div. Brief, supra note 309, at 22.
361. See generally Carey, 622 A.2d at 1282-84.
362. The standard of care is "determined upon a risk-benefit analysis: by bal-
ancing the risk, in light of the social value of the interest threatened, and the
probability and extent of the harm, against the value of the interest which the
actor is seeking to protect, and the expedience of the course pursued." PROSSER ON
TORTS, supra note 24, § 32, at 173. The standard of care changes with the circum-
stances and the occasion so that what might be considered proper conduct in one
instance could be negligence in another situation. Id. The standard of care is ob-




Looking at the evidence in a light most favorable to the
plaintiff, there was a failure of proof as to the defendants liabil-
ity for proximately causing the baby's death. Considering this
failure of proof by the plaintiff's own expert witness, the court
should have directed a verdict for the defendants. 364
Another issue that was not discussed by either the Appel-
late Division or the Supreme Court was Mrs. Carey's own negli-
gence365 in failing to monitor her diabetes effectively and
whether her actions proximately caused the baby's death. Mrs.
Carey had suffered from diabetes since childhood, 366 and knew
the level of self-care that was necessary to control her diabetes,
especially during pregnancy. 367 She was also aware of the possi-
bility of developing ketoacidosis, and could recognize its symp-
toms.3 68 On cross examination, Mrs. Carey admitted that she
did not consistently comply with her doctor's instructions. 369
The trial court did not allow Dr. Osler to admit into evidence his
journal which would have shown that on two occasions, Mrs.
Carey was hospitalized with ketoacidosis.370 Mrs. Carey also
testified that she and Dr. Lovett discussed the fact that "diabe-
tes carried a bad omen with pregnancy" and that close manage-
ment of the disease was therefore necessary.3 71 Dr. Lovett
delivered Mrs. Carey's first child in 1980. The child was born
in a given situation. This standard takes into account the actor's physical deficien-
cies. Thus, a person who has a disability is held to the same standard as a reason-
able man with the same disability. Id. § 32, at 176. In the case of the medical
profession, doctors must use the care which is reasonable in light of their superior
learning and experience. Id. § 32, at 185. They must have and use the "skill of the
'average' member of the profession." Id. § 32, at 187.
363. Defendant Lovett's App. Div. Brief, supra note 309, at 22.
364. In addition, it is apparent that because of the trial judge's prejudice and
excessive involvement, culpable defendants were dismissed from the case. Clearly,
the conduct of all who were directly involved with Mrs. Carey's hospital treatment
and delivery care was of such a nature as to have required a determination by the
trier of fact.
365. New Jersey follows a 51% fault bar system, under which a plaintiff can
recover if the defendant's fault is equal to or greater than the fault of the plaintiff.
See N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:15-5.1 (West 1987).
366. Defendant Osler's App. Div. Brief, supra note 263, at 4.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 3.
369. Id. at 6.
370. Id.




"one month prematurely and suffered from toxemia."372 Mrs.
Carey's second pregnancy ended in miscarriage in March of
1983. 33 Considering these facts, it is difficult to understand Jo
Ann Carey's failure to realize the gravity of her illness and her
failure to seek medical assistance sooner. Her failure to test for
ketones in her urine prior to speaking to Dr. Osler must be
questioned. There was no indication that the court considered
the possible damage that the baby might have suffered as a re-
sult of the ketoacidosis prior to Mrs. Carey's hospitalization.
Despite these possibly exacerbating circumstances, none of the
courts discussed whether Mrs. Carey was herself negligent.
Considering that the baby's death was proximately caused in
part by Mrs. Carey's treatment for ketoacidosis, her actions
should have been considered by the jury. Because the courts
did not decide the case based on these causation issues, the
question is whether the Supreme Court should have handled
Carey as a bystander case rather than a direct injury case be-
cause there was no direct physical impact. As in Carey, the
Berman v. Allan,374 Procanik v. C1 3 75 and Friel v. Vineland
Obstetrical & Gynecological Professional Ass'n376 cases dealt
with recovery for the parents' emotional distress resulting from
medical malpractice and misdiagnosis.37 It is here that any
similarity ends.
In Berman, the court found direct injury, albeit the loss of a
right, caused by the doctor's failure to perform an amni-
ocentesis.378 This failure led to Mrs. Berman's delivery of a
child with Down's syndrome, which resulted in the parents'
emotional distress.37 9 The doctor's omission effectively pre-
cluded Mr. and Mrs. Berman from exercising their right to
abort the damaged fetus and was thus deemed to be an injury
372. Carey, 622 A.2d at 1282.
373. Id.
374. 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979). See supra notes 57-69 and accompanying text.
375. 478 A.2d 755 (N.J. 1984). See supra notes 90-108 and accompanying
text.
376. 400 A.2d 147 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979). See supra notes 70-89 and
accompanying text.
377. See Berman, 404 A.2d at 11, 14; Procanik, 478 A.2d at 758; Friel, 400
A.2d at 148.
378. Berman, 404 A.2d at 14; see supra text accompanying note 69.




inflicted directly on them.380 The Procanik case was basically
the same as Berman, in that the Procaniks lost their right to
terminate the wife's pregnancy due to the doctor's misdiagnosis
of a test for German measles. 38'
In contrast, Mr. and Mrs. Carey did not realize any actual
direct injury from the birth of their seriously ill child.38 2 The
alleged omissions by Drs. Osler and Lovett did not have any
physical impact on the Careys. Nor did they compromise the
Careys' rights as parents.383
While it is alleged that Dr. Osler was negligent in failing to
direct Mrs. Carey to go to the hospital on October 10, Mrs. Ca-
rey was aware that if, after performing the urine test for ke-
tones, she observed a positive result, according to the doctor's
standard instructions she was to go to the hospital.38 Mrs. Ca-
rey did not perform the test.38 5 The Berman case is significantly
different since Mrs. Berman could not have performed her own
amniocentesis and did not even know that the test existed.
The facts in Frie1386 are similar to those in Carey.387 Like
the plaintiff in Friel, the plaintiff in Carey was pregnant and
became ill.388 Like Betty Friel, Jo Ann Carey went into prema-
ture labor and delivered a severely ill infant without the assist-
ance of her obstetrician. 389 Unlike Betty Friel's delivery, which
took place with no one in attendance, 39 Jo Ann Carey's delivery
was attended by experienced delivery room nurses.391 The ma-
jor difference between the two cases, however, was that in Friel,
the mother was directly injured when her doctor misdiagnosed
her condition as a bladder infection.392 Mrs. Friel suffered both
physically and emotionally for almost two weeks as a result of
380. Id. at 14.
381. See Procanik, 478 A.2d at 758. See also supra text accompanying notes
95-96.
382. See generally Carey, 622 A.2d at 1282-84.
383. See generally id. at 1282-84, 1290.
384. See Defendant Osler's App. Div. Brief, supra note 263, at 5.
385. See Carey, 622 A.2d at 1282.
386. See supra notes 73-85 and accompanying text.
387. See supra part III.A.
388. Friel, 400 A.2d at 148-49; Carey, 622 A.2d at 1282-83.
389. Friel, 400 A.2d at 149; Carey, 622 A.2d at 1283.
390. Friel, 400 A.2d at 149.
391. Carey, 622 A.2d at 1283.




her doctor's misdiagnosis.393 Jo Ann Carey was not physically
or emotionally damaged by Dr. Lovett's failure to attend the de-
livery or by his alleged negligent misdiagnosis of fetal demise,
since the baby was born alive.3 94
The finding by the courts of actual direct injury in Berman,
Procanik, and Friel satisfied the traditional standards for recov-
ery for emotional distress, as opposed to Carey, where direct in-
jury was absent and should have precluded such recovery.
Additionally, it should be noted that since Berman and Friel
were decided before Portee,395 which allowed for bystander re-
covery, 396 had the respective plaintiffs not been able to prove
direct injury they would have been barred from any recovery.
In Giardina v. Bennett,397 which was relied on by the
Careys at trial, the New Jersey Supreme Court extended the
law for recovery for emotional distress, but only when the case
involved a stillbirth.398 Mr. and Mrs. Giardina sought to recover
damages for the death of their baby before birth under New
Jersey's Wrongful Death Act.399
Mrs. Giardina was almost two weeks overdue when her
doctor performed tests and informed her that there was no
problem.40 0 Nine days later, when Mrs. Giardina began having
contractions, believing that her symptoms were normal, the
doctor refused to perform a Cesarean section.401 Nearly one
month overdue, Mrs. Giardina entered the hospital in labor and
delivered a stillborn baby.40 2
One significant difference between Giardina and Carey is
that the plaintiff in Giardina had every right to expect the nor-
mal birth of a healthy baby, whereas the plaintiff in Carey was
393. Id.
394. Defendant Lovett's App. Div. Brief, supra note 309, at 22.
395. See Portee v. Jaffee, 417 A.2d 521 (N.J. 1980); Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d
8 (N.J. 1979); Friel v. Vineland Obstetrical and Gynecological Professional Ass'n,
400 A.2d 147 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979).
396. See Portee, 417 A.2d at 528; see also supra notes and 41-50 accompanying
text.
397. 545 A.2d 139 (N.J. 1988). See supra notes 231-54 and accompanying
text.
398. Giardina, 545 A.2d at 143.
399. Id. at 139; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:31-1 (West 1987).






told before the birth that the baby would be stillborn. 403 Thus,
while Mrs. Giardina's shock was foreseeable, Mrs. Carey's claim
that she was shocked was not, since her baby was not stillborn
as anticipated. 40 4 Another distinction between these two cases
is that the Giardina's doctor directly caused the injury to the
fetus by not performing the Cesarean section before the fetus'
death.40 5 In Carey, neither Dr. Lovett nor Dr. Osler caused di-
rect injury to Mrs. Carey or her baby.4°6
The New Jersey Supreme Court, in Giardina, found that
"[tihe plaintiffs... as parents of a stillborn have suffered a cog-
nizable injury deserving of compensation. The Wrongful Death
Act, however, does not recognize this cause of action."40 7 The
court did not allow recovery under the Act,408 but did state that:
[m]edical malpractice causing a stillbirth results in infliction of a
direct injury to the mother as well as to her unborn child. Even
without any permanent physical harm, the mother suffers severe
and genuine injuries in the form of emotional distress and mental
anguish occasioned by her baby's stillbirth.40 9
Hence, the Giardina decision was specifically limited to recov-
ery for emotional distress as a result of medical malpractice
leading to a stillbirth.
In reviewing Carey, the New Jersey Supreme Court should
have affirmed the decision of the Appellate Division, which re-
lied on the bystander rule410 for recovery,411 rather than ex-
tending its holding in Giardina. The bystander requirements
offer a much sounder approach because the principles can be
readily applied to the facts of Carey without entering a laby-
rinth of speculative injuries. Since there was no actual direct
injury to Mr. or Mrs. Carey,412 they should have been considered
bystanders.
403. See Carey, 622 A.2d at 1284.
404. Defendant Lovett's App. Div. Brief, supra note 309, at 21.
405. Giardina, 545 A.2d at 140, 142.
406. Carey, 622 A.2d at 1284.
407. Giardina, 545 A.2d at 147.
408. Id. at 139.
409. Id. at 140.
410. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9; see also supra part II.C.
411. See Carey v. Lovett, No A-2654-8972, A-2458-89T2, slip op. at 14-16
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 5, 1991); see also Carey, 622 A.2d at 1281.
412. See generally Carey, 622 A.2d at 1282-84.
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As in Lindenmuth v. Alperin,413 Jansen v. Children's Hospi-
tal Medical Center,414 and Frame v. Kothari,415 where parents
sued for their emotional distress caused by the misdiagnosis of
their children's illnesses, 416 so too, the Careys sued for emo-
tional distress allegedly caused by Dr. Lovett's misdiagnosis
and Dr. Osler's alleged failure to have Jo Ann Carey admitted
into the hospital on October 10th.417 Heretofore, in most by-
stander cases where the Dillon rule41 is followed, the claimant
has not recovered without proof of a contemporaneous observa-
tion of the injury caused by the misdiagnosis or malpractice. 419
The court in Lindenmuth denied recovery because the mis-
diagnosis could not be perceived and the plaintiff could not re-
cover for observing the result rather than an act.420 In Jansen,
the court denied recovery and refused to extend the bystander
rule to encompass the observation of the result of misdiagnosis
rather than observation of the negligent act.42' In Frame, the
New Jersey Supreme Court denied recovery because the doc-
tor's negligence in failing to tell the parents to take their son to
the hospital did not result in an immediate injury to the child
and his death did not occur until eleven hours later.422 Addi-
tionally, the court noted that recovery would not be allowed
without a contemporaneous observation of the injury.423 Simi-
larly, the Carey's emotional distress, founded on the birth of
their seriously ill baby, resulted from alleged malpractice that
413. 484 A.2d 1316 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. 1984); see supra notes 110-34
and accompanying text.
414. 106 Cal. Rptr. 883 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973); see supra notes 120-27 and ac-
companying text.
415. 560 A.2d 675 (N.J. 1989); see supra notes 157-83 and accompanying text.
416. Lindenmuth, 484 A.2d at 1316; Jansen, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 884; Frame, 560
A.2d at 676.
417. See Carey, 622 A.2d at 1281-82.
418. See supra text accompanying notes 6-9. See also supra part II.C.
419. See generally Justus v. Atchison, 565 P.2d 122 (Cal. 1977); Jansen v.
Children's Hospital Ctr., 106 Cal. Rptr. 883 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973); Frame v. Kothari,
560 A.2d 675 (N.J. 1989); Portee v. Jaffee, 417 A.2d 521 (N.J. 1980); Lindenmuth v.
Alperin, 484 A.2d 1316 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984). But cf Polikoffv. Calabro,
506 A.2d 1285 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1986). Had the court in Polikoff strictly
adhered to the third requirement of the Dillon rule, requiring observation of the
death or injury, the Polikoff's would have been denied recovery.
420. 484 A.2d at 1318.
421. 106 Cal. Rptr. at 885.
422. 560 A.2d at 681.
423. Id. at 678-79.
41
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was not observable by either of them.424 Dr. Osler's alleged fail-
ure to order Mrs. Carey into the hospital preceded the birth by
approximately twenty-four hours425 and the baby's eventual
death 426 by more than ten days.427 Similarly, Dr. Lovett's al-
leged misdiagnosis of fetal demise preceded the birth by six
hours. 428 Thus, the Carey's sought to recover for emotional dis-
tress from observing the result rather than the act of the al-
leged malpractice.
When compared to Justus v. Atchison429 and Polikoff v.
Calabro,430 the Careys' claim fails as well. In Justus, the plain-
tiffs were denied recovery because the court held that their
shock did not result from a direct emotional impact. 431 Neither
father knew of his infant's death until their doctor informed
them, despite being present in the delivery room and witnessing
the troubled birth.43 2 A different circumstance existed in Poli-
koff, where the mother witnessed the actual injury to her
daughter and was allowed to recover for her emotional dis-
tress.433 The Careys did not know of their daughter's serious
state until they were informed by the medical personnel in the
hospital. 434 Additionally, as the appellate division noted, the
Careys were told to expect their child to be stillborn,435 and thus
"the circumstances do not fall within the category of 'shocking'"
as established by the New Jersey Supreme Court.436
As in Giardina, the New Jersey Supreme Court in the Ca-
rey decision seemed to be skirting the direct victim rule. Had
the court discussed the foreseeability issue it so carefully
avoided, it might have been able to fashion a decision that did
424. See generally Carey, 622 A.2d at 1282-84, 1286.
425. Id. at 1282-83.
426. Id. at 1284.
427. Id. at 1282-84.
428. Id. at 1283.
429. 565 A.2d 122 (N.J. 1977); see supra notes 128-34 and accompanying text.
430. 506 A.2d 1285 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986); see supra notes 136-56
and accompanying text.
431. Justus, 565 A.2d at 135-36.
432. Id. at 136.
433. Polikoff, 506 A.2d at 1288.
434. Carey, 622 A.2d at 1283.
435. Carey v. Lovett, No. A-2754-89T2, A-2748-89T2, slip op. at 16 (N.J.





not wreak havoc on prior case law and establish workable
guidelines for future decisions.
V. Ramifications of the Carey Decision
The direct victim rule, together with the prodigal Carey ex-
pansion of the law, have serious and far reaching implications
for the medical profession, courts of law, and health care recipi-
ents. In November of 1985, Drug Research Reports published
the results of a 1985 survey released by the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG).437 "The survey of
1,400 obstetricians/gynecologists examined what effects the
threat of malpractice suits has on the practice of obstetrics and
gynecology."438 Ninety percent of the doctors surveyed reported
an increase in their malpractice insurance, with the average in-
crease amounting to $9,871.439 Eighty percent of the physicians
increased their fees because of increased insurance premi-
ums. 44O Two-thirds of the doctors participating in the survey re-
ported that they increased their use of defensive medicine, 441
twelve percent had stopped practicing obstetrics and fourteen
percent decreased the number of deliveries they handled, all as
a result of the threat of malpractice suits.442
These facts have not gone unnoticed by the courts. In their
concurring opinion in Frame, Justices Wilentz and Garibaldi
voiced their concerns about expanding recovery for emotional
distress, caused by medical malpractice, to family members. 443
437. DRUG RESEARCH REPORTS, F-D-C REPORTS, INC., MEDICAL LIABILITY IN-
SURANCE COST INCREASES THREATEN ACCESS TO OBSTETRICS/GYNECOLOGY SERV-
ICES, THE BLUE SHEET, 28(47): 5, Nov. 20, 1985 (F-D-C Reports, Inc.), available in
LEXIS, Genmed Library, F-D-C Reports File [hereinafter THE BLUE SHEET]. The
survey was conducted by Needham, Porter, and Novelli, Inc., a Washington D.C.




441. Id. Defensive medicine includes the use of unnecessary Cesarean sec-
tions, excessive diagnostic tests, and refusal of patients who are uninsured or have
only Medicaid coverage. Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Obstetrics and Malpractice;
Evidence on the Performance of a Selective No-Fault System, JAMA, June 5, 1991,
at 1.
442. THE BLUE SHEET, supra note 437, at 5.




[C]hanges in the law must be preceded "by a balancing of social
interests, and estimate of social values."
... We suspect that the cost to society of expanding medical
malpractice liability to allow a family member to recover for his or
her emotional distress as a result of a physician's improper diag-
nosis will outweigh the benefits to society. Possible costs to society
include the increasing number of physicians who refuse to prac-
tice in certain fields, the cost, in all fields, of an increase in "defen-
sive medicine," and the increasing cost of medical treatment
itself.444
The Connecticut Supreme Court, which follows the Dillon
rule,445 has refused to apply it to medical malpractice cases.
446
Among other reasons, the court is concerned that "the detrimen-
tal consequences to the community are far too great compared
to 'the benefit a few hypersensitive individuals would be likely
to derive . ... "447
Even the California Supreme Court, which developed the
direct victim rule, has backtracked from its holding in Molien v.
Kaiser Foundation Hospital,448 the first direct victim case. Its
initial rule that a person was a direct victim if their emotional
distress was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the de-
fendant's conduct,449 cast a wide net.
The California Supreme Court seemed to totally retreat
from the direct victim rule when it reviewed Thing v. La
Chusa.450 However, in 1992, the court once again embraced di-
rect victim recovery in Burgess v. Superior Court.451 In that de-
cision, the court specifically noted the continuing confusion
about application of the direct victim rule in the lower courts.
452
444. Id. (Wilentz & Garibaldi, JJ., concurring) (citations omitted).
445. See supra text accompanying 8-9.
446. Blanche Wilkinson, Student Note, Bystander Emotional Distress Claims
in Medical Malpractice Actions, 15 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 605 (1992) (citing Maloney
v. Conroy, 545 A.2d 1059 (Conn. 1988)).
447. Id. at 621 (quoting Maloney, 545 A.2d at 1064).
448. 616 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980). See supra notes 185-201 and accompanying
text.
449. See Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 823 (Cal. 1989). See also supra text
accompanying note 201.
450. 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989). See supra notes 202-10 and accompanying text.
451. 831 P.2d 1197 (Cal. 1992). See supra notes 211-30 and accompanying
text.




It stated that proof of traditional negligence elements are re-
quired for recovery for negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress,453 and also held that the duty owed to the plaintiff by the
defendant had to arise out of an existing relationship between
the two.454 Unlike the New Jersey Supreme Court in Carey, the
California Supreme Court in Burgess offered an in depth expla-
nation and analysis of recovery under this rule. Additionally,
unlike the Carey court, the Burgess court acknowledged the im-
pact of their decision on the medical malpractice insurance
crisis.4S5
VI. Conclusion
Rather than clarifying the standards for recovery in New
Jersey cases involving negligent infliction of emotional distress
and alleviating future inconsistencies, the Carey court has cre-
ated more confusion. When other states are weighing the ef-
fects of expanded liability on medical providers and recipients
and reverting to stricter standards, the New Jersey Supreme
Court is expanding the law without such consideration. It ap-
pears that the New Jersey appellate court had a better grasp of
the facts of Carey, the standards used for awarding damages for
negligent infliction of emotional distress, and the great social
implications for the practice of gynecology in New Jersey than
did the New Jersey Supreme Court. In its zeal to protect the
interests of those with perceived injuries, the New Jersey
Supreme Court has framed a rule which attempts to insure
what even medical science can not guarantee.
Fredda Fixler-Fuchs*
453. Id. at 1200. See also supra text accompanying note 223.
454. Burgess, 831 P.2d at 1201. See also supra text accompanying note 226.
455. Burgess, 831 P.2d at 1207. The court noted that "[tihe problem of
professsional liability adversely affects the delivery of obstetrical services, espe-
dally to disadvantaged women, those living in rural areas, and those with high
risk pregnancies." Id. They went on to note that the California Legislature had
taken steps to "alleviate the 'crisis' in medical malpractice liability" by limiting the
recovery of noneconomic damages to $250,000 and the statute of limitations for
medical malpractice claims brought by adults to three years from the date of injury
or one year after discovery of the injury. Id. at 1208.
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